Kabardino-Balkaria+Outlook

=Insurgents In Kabardino-Balkaria Likely To Continue Destabilizing The Republic Over The Next Twelve Months=

Kabardino-Balkaria: Key Findings

Even though Kabardino-Balkaria has remained separated from the insurgent fighting that has plagued most of the North Caucasus region in the past, it is now becoming unstable due to the insurgency spreading[|.] It is likely that the insurgents will continue to destabilize the country over the next twelve months due to the ineffectiveness of Russian forces, socio-economic problems, decreasing political support, and the structure and operations of the rebel forces.
 * Executive Summary:**

Insurgents in KBR make it a top priority to obtain control over the mountainous regions in the Northern Caucasus in order to set up remote facilities where they can prepare young fighters to join the fight in the future[|.] The strategy of taking control of the foothills and mountainous regions of the northern section of the North Caucasian range allows the insurgents to have access to resources including extra manpower, supplies, and provides safe passage for the insurgents from republic to republic[|.] The Russian forces have been unable to access the mountainous regions that the rebels have been training and recruiting to due to inadequate training and poor intelligence[|.] The militants have a network of mountain camps and guerilla bases in countries in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria[|.] The mountains give the rebels the element of surprise during many of their attacks, giving the Russian forces little time to react appropriately[|.]
 * Discussion:[[image:300px-Kabardino-balkaria_map.png width="310" height="234" align="right" caption="Map Showing Mountainous Regions In KBR" link="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b5/Kabardino-balkaria_map.png/300px-Kabardino-balkaria_map.png"]]**

According to Yuri Tomchak, the Interior Minister of KBR, as of 5 September 2007, about 500 militants are hiding in mountainous areas of the country[|.] The threat of insurgent attacks deter the police forces and army units from pro-actively searching the mountains[|.] In the Elbrus District, located in the southwest corner of KBR (see map), insurgents established a stronghold due to the support from the local population[|.] This summer, the insurgents have significantly increased their activities, specifically in KBR. The militants are now very active in some areas of the region and still remain quiet in others, however, it is clear that plans and preparations for future attacks are under way[|.]

In response to this increased activity, in the summer of 2007 the Russian military sent specialized mountain warfare units to the North Caucasus, however, the implementation to these units into active operations will not occur until the end of 2007[|.] Although, a training exercise took place between July to 13 August 2007 in the Elbrus District of KBR to measure the capabilities of the units, the mountain forces lack real counterinsurgency experience[|.]

On 8 May 2007, a seminar on fighting crime and corruption in the North Caucasus region was held in Nalchik, the capital of KBR, between high ranking officials of KBR and staff from North Caucasian police academies[|.] During the seminar, officials stated that the poor collection of intelligence on the insurgents is one of the main problems facing the security forces in KBR[|.] Fueling the lack of good intelligence is the distrust of law enforcement by the local population. Interior Minister Tomchak stated that, "only popular trust in the law enforcement bodies would help establish an effective system of getting information from the grass roots.[|"]

There is a high degree of dissatisfaction among the people of Kabardino-Balkaria due to the socio-economic problems in the republic[|.] A survey from late 2005 from the Caucasus Times survey in Nalchik indicated that economic problems worry almost the entire population of Kabardino-Balkaria, 95%[|.] Also, 44% of residents are concerned about security in the republic which is the cause of most of the economic instability[|.]Many people have expressed that the most current problems are high prices, low wages, unemployment, and corruption[|.] Many people related these problems to the security issue, saying these problems are direct causes from the instability that the insurgents have brought to the region[|.] With the gradual spreading and increase of violence of the insurgents Kabardino-Balkaria’s economy will likely continue to suffer[|.] Due partly to the socioeconomic problems, the KBR has also experienced decreasing political support for the president, Arsen Kanokov[|.] Until social and economic conditions improve, insurgent activities will continue to affect the stability of the region[|.] Also, Kanokov has lost support due to the fact that the populace is unsatisfied with his strategies against battling the insurgency[|.]

Kanokov has recently stated that his recent campaign against religious extremism was counterproductive[|.] The closing of almost all mosques by republic officials during the campaign was a "mistake” that did more harm than good. Even though he has reopened these mosques now, more uprisings and fighting has been the result[|.]

The Russian authorities have accepted the militants' premise that the conflict with Moscow and the insurgents is only religious in nature when in fact this is not the case[|.] It first began as an ethnic problem in Chechnya and remains a largely economic and social issue for most people[|.] Kanokov has said, “The population's low income and unemployment create the soil for religious extremists and other destructive forces to conduct an ideological war against us[|.]” The conflict now has much more of a resonance with other groups in the North Caucasus due to the increasingly strong religious undertone[|.] This will make the situation for the Russian police and military forces more complicated[|.] Rather than focusing on improving the local economy and stopping corruption, local governments ­have become obsessed with the idea of religious extremism[|.] This causes more problems because it has been used as a tool to increase recruiting done by the militants in the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus[|.] Unless polices are implemented by the current government that increase socioeconomic stability the militants will continue to attack and President Kanokov will lose more support from the populace[|.] Svante Cornell, an expert on the North Caucasus region at Sweden's Uppsala University said,"...you've seen the spread of radical Islamic groupings from Chechnya out into the rest of the North Caucasus very much because of the counterproductive policies followed by the Russian leadership and their utter inability to deal with the socioeconomic problems in the region[|.]"

In addition, the structure and operations of the KBR rebels make it difficult for Russian forces to counter[|.] The rebels in KBR only represent a web of small groups, usually numbering no more than five people, while other may have over a hundred[|.] The Kabardino-Balkaria rebels had almost 10,000 members in 2005 that dispersed into various group sizes that operate in different locations throughout the country, each having a leader[|.] Approximately 500 to 800 of these members are operating in the mountains[|.] Due to this, it is extremely difficult for Russian military and security forces to do significant damage to the rebel’s structure and halt their operations throughout the country[|.]

Another reason why it is difficult to control rebel attacks is because they have created ties to other resistance groups across the region[|.] Each of these resistance groups may operate differently so a strategy that the Russian forces implement against one group, may not work against another[|.] Also, the rebels often receive support from different socioeconomic groups and individuals in the local government and security services which help them execute operations in the region[|.] The insurgents can also work together in the region because the Islamic ideology of the insurgency helps the rebels to overcome the ethnic differences that define the region[|.]

The extensiveness of the mountainous regions has allowed for a wider scope of operations for anti-Russian militants[|.] The emergence of the rebel's wider scope of operations threatens to stretch Russian resources thin and create more anti-Russian resistance in the North Caucasus[|.] In addition to their camps in the mountains, these groups have also been able to create a network of villages and settlements throughout the region[|.] Recruitment of young people for the future is also a primary use of these facilities in the mountains[|.]

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 9 Analytic Confidence: 8

Matthew Gurto

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