Ingushetia+Outlook

=Widespread Violence and Ineffective Governing Likely To Destabilize Ingushetia Over Next 12 Months=

Ingushetia: Key Findings

Executive Summary:
Ingushetia experienced the largest growth of violence of any republic in the North Caucasus over the previous 12 months. Counterterrorism efforts undertaken by Ramzan Kadyrov in the republic of Chechnya pushed the center of violence west to Ingushetia, while simultaneously increasing the number of violent actors in the republic and creating numerous socio-economic problems. The situation in Ingushetia is likely to continue to deteriorate and experience increases in violence over the next 12 months due to a growing insurgency fueled by ineffective counterterrorism techniques, inabilities by the government to combat socio-economic issues, and growing conflicts across border and ethnic lines.

Discussion:
On 8 August 2007, Vladimir Putin sent 2,500 federal Russian soldiers to Ingushetia to combat the daily murders, shootings, bombings, and other violence within the republic [|.] Despite Putin’s efforts, the deployment of more troops to Ingushetia only increased the violence in the area and created more potential targets for violent groups to exploit. The Russian government ordered the removal of the 2,500 additional soldiers on October 10th, who left the republic in the same violent ridden state it was in a month earlier[|.] Putin currently calls Ingushetia a counter-terrorism zone, the same moniker placed upon Chechnya before the Second Chechen War[|.] The harsh and extreme tactics of Russian security forces, including reprisals and kidnappings, alienates Ingush citizens against the government and recruits more militants towards the resistance[|.]

From September 2006 to September 2007, Ingushetia witnessed 86 violent attacks, or 33 percent of all attacks in the North Caucasus over that time period. The only republic to top Ingushetia's percentage of attacks was Chechnya, with 40 percent of the overall attacks occuring in the embattled republic. Ingushetia experienced a significant increase in the number of attacks from September 2006 to September 2007, with the total number of violent acts growing from 10 to 24, or 140 percent. The majority of the attacks from July to September 2007 were low level shootings, constituting for 60 percent of attacks. The average number of casualties per violent incident in Ingushetia from September 2006 to September 2007 of 2.13 individuals shows a trend in low level violence resulting in a small number of casualties. Also, the number of attacks occurring in Ingushetia in September of 2007 nearly doubled the number of attacks in Chechnya, which illustrates a shift of the center of violence.

While the Ingush government attributes this current high level of violence solely to a small group of Arab-financed Islamic radicals, it is virtually certain that a single group is not responsible for all the attacks in the republic[|.] Those likely accountable for the current upsurge in violence include a combination of Islamic militants, separatists/nationalists, and North Ossetian citizens[|.] Given the sustained crisis, and an almost universal dissatisfaction with the current political and economic state of Ingushetia, all residents have multiple reasons to join the resistance[|.] In September 2007, Putin organized temporary operational groups of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in each Ingush district's police department[|.] These operational groups consist of 25-30 policemen from different regions of the Russian Federation, along with employees of the Federal Security Service from neighboring republics[|.] The people of Ingushetia distrust these security groups, due to the extensive and common belief that operational group members currently engage in the kidnappings and murders of young people in the Ingushetia territory[|.] In neighboring Chechnya, President Ramzan Kadyrov used brute military force to disperse much of the insurgency and eliminate many violent leaders in Chechnya, but his perceived victory only moved the violence elsewhere while the insurgency continued to gather force. The institution of this strategy inIngushetia would not address the socio-economic and political issues which fuel violence in the republic[|.]

In 2002, former Ingush president and Putin-critic Ruslan Aushev resigned his post of President of Ingushetia, and Russian Federation Council member[|.] His successor, former KGB and FSB member Murat Zyazikov, took over the presidency with extensive support from Vladimir Putin in a Kremlin-manipulated 2002 election[|.] The Kremlin’s direct involvement in the installation of loyal local-elites, such as Zyazikov, mirrors past Russian Imperial and Soviet strategies of maintaining control over the North Caucasus[|.] These previous strategies have historically been ineffective, and subsequently intensified tensions, produced new conflicts, and resulted in power shifts within the system rather than changing the system itself[|.]

Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia’s economy has marginally improved, but the republic currently holds the lowest income per-capita in the Russian Federation and a 36% unemployment rate[|.] The administration also currently shows neither the wherewithal to curtail the rising violence nor the ability to deal with unresolved ethnic problems[|.] The Ingush government's ineffectiveness is one of the driving forces behind the current upsurge of violence in the republic. While Putin openly praises the work of Zyazikov in the media, sources within the Kremlin believe Putin’s patience is wearing thin, and Putin may move to remove Zyazikov, coerce him to resign, or even unite Ingushetia and Chechnya as one republic[|.] Zyazikov recently categorically denied the possibility that he would tender his resignation, despite almost unanimous disapproval and numerous attempts on his life[|.]

A main source of Ingush citizens disdain towards Murat Zyazikov is his inability to resolve the ongoing conflict between Ingushetia and North Ossetia[|.] After Ingushetia became a separate republic in 1992, a border dispute occurred over the district of Prigorodny, between the primarily Muslim Ingushetia and the primarily Christian North Ossetia[|.] While Putin made an attempt for peace in a 2002 cooperation agreement, the Beslan hostage crisis of 2004 worsened Ossetian-Ingush relations[|.] The attack on Beslan, perpetrated by Islamic militants, resulted in over 300 deaths and 700 wounded inside a school in Beslan, North Ossetia[|.] The former leader of the Chechen insurgency, Shamil Basayev, took responsibility for the attack, with the ultimate goal of igniting tensions between the Christian Ossetians, and the Muslim Ingush citizens. Since the Beslan attack, violence has increased near Ossetian-Ingush borders, with reports of kidnappings of ethnic Ingush people by the Ossetian group, Lesnyi Bratia[|.]

In addition to land disputes with North Ossetia, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov issued numerous statements to the press indicating his desire to unite Ingushetia and Chechnya as one single republic[|.] Ingush citizens already took to border-conflict violence in North Ossetia, and also against the FSB who took control of the Ingush district of Dzheirakh in 2006[|.] The possible unification of Chechnya and Ingushetia by Kadyrov is far more severe than either of these instances, and a current categorical opposition towards a unified state by Ingush citizens points to an even worse violent response in the future[|.]

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 7 Analytic Confidence: 8

Robert A. Williams

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