Kabardino-Balkaria+Key+Findings

=Kabardino-Balkaria Insurgents Likely To Continue Destabilizing The Country Over The Next Twelve Months=

Even though Kabardino-Balkaria has remained separated from the insurgent fighting that has plagued most of the North Caucasus region in the past, it is now becoming unstable due to the insurgency spreading[|.] It is likely that the insurgents will continue to destabilize the country over the next twelve months due to the ineffectiveness of Russian forces, continuing socio-economic problems, decreasing political support, and the structure and operations of the rebel forces.
 * Executive Summary:**

__Severity and Effectiveness:__ As a result of the geographic shift westward of the North Caucasus insurgency Kabardino-Balkaria saw increases in both the number of attacks and amount of casualties within the time period of September 2006 and September 2007. During the thirteen months, Kabardino-Balkaria had 13 individual attacks, resulting in 11 casualties, which is approximately .84 casualties per attack. Despite the low casualty rate, 76 percent of the total attacks and 63 percent of the total casualties occurred between July and September 2007. The primary targets were both the Russian security forces and civilians accounting for 90 percent of the total casualties, or simply 5 casualties each. While the most prolific type of attacks used by the insurgents in Kabardino-Balkaria were bombings, representing 61 percent, or 8, of the total attacks, and second were shootings with 4 individual attacks. Although Kabardino-Balkaria averaged 1 attack per month, September 2007 had the highest number of attacks with 6. In addition, the city of Nalchik registered the highest frequency with 6 total attacks, while the Elbruss District had 4.


 * Insurgency: The rebels use of the mountainous regions that make up most of the North Caucasus for training and recruiting young people have provided a safe haven and a place for growing. Due to the ineffectiveness of the Russian military and security forces to significantly damage their structure in these remote locations it is likely that the rebels in Kabardino-Balkaria will continue to recruit more and expand their operations in the North Caucasus region over the next twelve months.


 * __Socio-Economic:__ Recently, the insurgency has caused many socio-economic problems and has resulted in low living standards, a high unemployment rate, and a significant amount of corruption and fighting. More generally, the situation has resulted in the dissatisfaction of the majority of the populace. Due to this, Kabardino-Balkaria's economy is likely to continue to deteriorate over the next twelve months.

Russian Capabilities and Effectiveness: The current strategy of the insurgents in Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) seeks to create remote bases in the mountainous regions of the republic in order to train new fighters, conduct guerilla attacks, and establish safe passages across the North Caucasus region for insurgents to pass from republic to republic. The newly created Russian mountain units have very little experience and often operate from poor intelligence making them ineffective against the insurgents. Despite police and military reinforcements in the country, the insurgents continue to grow and actively attack throughout the republic. Due to this, it is unlikely that the security forces will successfully combat insurgent activities over the next twelve months.

Kremlin Ability To Control: Kabardino-Balkaria has been plagued with economic and security instability due mostly to the insurgency that has now spread into the republic, which has caused instability in the country. It is likely that Arsen Kanokov will continue to lose support over the next twelve months due to the instability of the economy and diminishing security in the republic.

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 7 Analytic Confidence: 7

Matthew Gurto

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