Dagestan+Outlook

=Insurgent Activity in Dagestan Likely To Remain Constant Over The Next Twelve Months Due To Rising Islamic Militancy, Economic Instability, And Local Governmental Corruption=

Dagestan: Key Findings

Insurgent activity in Dagestan is likely to continue to increase due to rising Islamic militancy, economic instability, and government corruption within the republic. Aliyev, the newly installed Dagestani president, has failed to address the major social, economic problems and insurgent violence within the Dagestan republic. In fact, a majority of the Dagestani population considers Aliyev a massive disappointment. The insurgency in Dagestan has intensified, with militant Islam growing throughout the region. Although a majority of Dagestan's population is Islamic, a growing number of the population is turning to violent forms of Islam. Russian Security Forces killed one of the leaders of the Dagestani insurgency, Rappani Khalilov. The death of Khalilov is likely to incite further violence throughout the insurgency, as radical Islam is likely to continue to grow in popularity. Violence in Dagestan is likely to continue, specifically attacks involving bombings and shooting and Dagestan totaled 61 attacks in the republic from September 2006 to October 2007.
 * Executive Summary:**

Dagestan is the most ethnically diverse republic in the Russian Confederation, with 32 ethnic groups[|.] Both local and federal authorities claim the insurgency in Dagestan as centered on ethnic, economic tensions,including the high rate of unemployment, and corruption in the government[|.] Dagestan's political climate is known for its inter-ethnic party conflicts, where most of the debate is not among political parties, but instead among ethnic groups and clans[|.]
 * Discussion:**[[image:dagestan_map.JPG width="317" height="222" align="right" caption="Map of Dagestan, bordered by Chechnya and Russia" link="http://www.russianpatches.com/images/dagestan.gif"]]

Since the installment in February 2006 of President Mukhu Aliyev, both officials and local authorities argue the change in leadership in Dagestan has not made any significant differences within the republic[|.] Aliyev, officially became president of Dagestan on 20 February 2007[|.] Many within the Russian and Dagestani government met Aliyev's appointment as president with optimism, as they hoped Aliyev would crack down on corruption, stimulate the economy, and effectively combat the insurgency[|.] However, Aliyev has not affectively dealt with the major problems within the Dagestani republic [|.] According to [|Chechnya Weekly] article, entitled, [|"Dagestan: Russia's Eternal Problem"] the majority of the Dagestani population considers Aliyev a "massive disappointment"[|.] Experts believe Putin's endorsement and support of Aliyev as president, likely centers around the fact that the Kremlin believes Aliyev is weak as a politician and allows Moscow to easily control the Dagestani local government[|.]

Aliyev reported in August 2007 that the number of terrorist attacks and attacks against law enforcement has decreased in Dagestan[|.] As stated by Aliyev, “"The main goal of these criminals is to weaken our operational and investigative staff and influence its morale and authority. But these illegal elements will not succeed. It is no exaggeration to say that brave and courageous people work in our law-enforcement agencies. They are repelling criminals and terrorists, but in doing so they often become targets for the enemies of the state[|.]" However, contradicting reports claim that Aliyev has not been effective in combating the root causes of the insurgency, including the economy and corruption within the republic, and in fact terrorist attacks are on the rise in Dagestan[|.] Central Asia Caucasus Institute reports Dagestan is the second most dangerous region in Russia, with the number of armed encounters against insurgents passing Chechnya[|.] Jane's Information Group reports that in 2007, militant attacks increased in Dagestan, with attacks primarily against security forces and state officials. The cited reasons including lack of attention of soci-economic issues in the region and while there is a growing trend of Jihadist violence, local issues and policies continue to play a major role in the growing militancy. It is highly likely that these issues are the leading contributing factors behind the recent rising number of terrorist incidents. According to Jane's Information Group, the recent violent outbreaks and growing violence in the republics of both Dagestan and Ingushetia, point to trends which claim that the Chechen insurgency is relocating into neighboring republics. In 2005, insurgent attacks reportedly occurred once every three days.

In the fall of 2007, [|The Jamestown Foundation] stated Dagestani insurgents are intensifying propaganda efforts including posting video statements and testimonies from commanders or guerrilla insurgents in the region onto pro-insurgent internet websites[|.] [|Kavkaz Center] posted two videos including Khalilov calling to Dagestani Muslims to join the Jihad's fight and the second video portraying Dagestan's underground Islamic rebel group Sharia Jamaat[|.] In addition, another video shows four armed Dagestanis expressing their own opinions and motivations for their involvement in the insurgency[|.] Ultimately, each of these fighters believe that every Muslim that gives his or her life for the Islamic faith become martyrs and will go to heaven after they sacrifice their lives[|.] The rebels mention in the video Dagestan's anti-Russian uprisings under "Jihadist slogans" and one rebel states, "We are proud of such heroes as Imam Mukhtar, Imam Shamil, Shamil Basaev, Khattab and Osama bin Laden and we will follow their path"[|.] Both Mukhtar and Shamil fought against the Russian empire in the 19th century as Dagestani leaders and both Basaev and Khattab are Chechen rebel warlords[|.]

Through these videos, it is clear that the driving force behind the insurgency in Dagestan derives from various sources including radical Islamic beliefs, aligned with both nationalist and separatist motivations in resisting Russian occupation of the republics of the Caucasus region [|.] Khalilov's recorded statement provides proof of the insurgents resistance to Russian rule when he proclaimed, "Dagestanis cannot be called men as long as they are under the control of Moscow[|.]" In addition, reports from Jane's Information Group claim that militant groups in Dagestan, such as Shariat Jamaat and Ingush Jamaat Shariat, while they seek to create an Islamic state, they also concern themselves with fighting the Russian occupation of the republic.

Russian Special Forces reported the death of the militant leader in Dagestan, Rappani Khalilov on 17 September 2007[|.] Khalilov reportedly was responsible for more than 60 terrorist attacks on the Federal Security Service[|.] Since 2006, Khalilov commanded the entire Dagestani Islamist insurgency[|.] In 1999 Khalilov called for unification of Dagestan and Chechnya and separation from Russia[|.] Viewed as a martyr[|,] Khalilov's death is likely to incite his followers and fellow rebels to commit even more strongly to the cause in the upcoming months. The death of Khalilov, for the Russian Special Forces, is considered a victory, as they killed one of the most elusive terrorists throughout the Caucasus region[|.] Deputy leader, Abdul Madzhid, was announced as the new leader in place of Khalilov[|.] Violence in the Dagestan is likely to continue to increase, specifically low level attacks including shootings and bombings. September 2007 recorded the highest number of attacks, with seven total within Dagestan and a total of 50 between Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. From September 2006 to September 2007, there were 50 attacks in Dagestan. In addition, rebel activity, according to reports from the [|Jamestown Foundation], has increased since the beginning of 2007[|.]

Russia relies on oppressive methods in attempts to decrease militant activity in the Caucasus region and authorities are hesitant to use these methods are restricted from voicing their opinions. In an article entitled, Radicalising Russia's Caucasian Muslims, Jane's Information Group states that local authorities looking to create a "positive strategy" are often considered "powerless" and ineffective. In an effort to combat the rising level of violence in Dagestan, local security forces now use controversial methods, including "zakhvat" or "the snatch" of suspected militants. This method is technically referred to as an "arrest", although in actuality, it is kidnapping. These kidnappings are also referred to as “extra-judicial executions” or “illegal detentions”. Although the insurgents are traditionally known to participate in a majority of the kidnappings in the Caucasus region, since 2006 the number of kidnappings decreased seven percent throughout the North Caucasus region. Conversely, kidnappings by Russian security forces is on the rise. The central ministry of the interior of Moscow reports that one in five of all kidnappings in the North Caucasus is likely carried out by security forces. Persons taken by security forces in Dagestan are often sent to an army base in Chechnya for interrogation and in some cases tortured, beaten, and subjected to military law. Jane's Information Group states that the primary reason that militants are captured and sent to locations outside of the republic's jurisdiction, is so that there is a smaller risk of local fighters and sympathizers freeing the captives. Also, the relocation allows a large number of suspects to "disappear" so that their families have difficulty locating them or finding out if they are even alive. No notification of the missing person is required since it is outside of the jurisdiction of the Dagestani courts.

A factor arguably behind the growing number of radical Muslims in the North Caucasus and specifically in Dagestan, is the low economic standards in the republic[|.] The general consensus among the population of Dagestan is that the local officials are not working effectively enough to combat the social, economic, and security issues in the republic. The UN reports unemployment in 2007 in Dagestan having reached nearly 27 percent in Dagestan and a total of 77 percent of Dagestan's budget comes from Moscow[|.] The opinions of the local and regional leaders are met with great disdain, and they people of Dagestan continue to become restless awaiting a response from the local authorities concerning any type of solutions, which may prove effective in turning the low quality of living around[|.]

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 7.5

Kathryn A Connelly

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