North+Caucasus+Outlook

=**Steady, Low Level Insurgent Attacks Likely To Continue And Spread Westward Toward Ingushetia And Kabardino-Balkaria Over The Next Twelve Months**=

Key Findings

**Executive Summary:**
Based on a quantitative and geographic analysis of insurgent attacks over the last year, it is likely that the Islamic insurgency will maintain its current level of operations in Chechnya and Dagestan while continuing to shift and increase operations westward over the next twelve months towards Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. It is also likely that government officials and Russian security forces within each republic will remain ineffective in combating the known insurgency strategies and socio-economic problems.

**Severity And Effectiveness**
The number of attacks in the North Caucasus in September 2007 is 56 percent higher than the number of attacks a year earlier in September 2006. Over that time period of 13 months, 40 percent of all attacks occurred in Chechnya while Ingushetia accounted for 33 percent. However in August and September of 2007, the number of attacks in Ingushetia is 58 percent larger than the number of attacks in Chechnya. A recent surge of insurgent activity in the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria coupled with rising violence in Ingushetia points to a geographic shift of violence westward from Chechnya. The average number of casualties per violent incident in the North Caucasus over the past 13 months is 2.12. Thus, low casualty frequencies coupled with a 93 percent increase in shootings from September 2006 to September 2007 shows a distinct trend towards steady, low-level conflict. Security forces and government officials are the primary targets of this increase in violence, with these two groups consisting of 73 percent of casualties over the past 13 months. Through the quantitative and geographic analysis of the insurgent attacks from September 2006 through September 2007, it is likely that attacks will continue to move westward across the North Caucasus with a continued increase in low level conflicts primarily targeting Russian and republic security forces due to the development of hotspot trends in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, and the high frequency of casualties by servicemen over the last 4 months. However, after adding September 2007 to October 2007 and analyzing these two months with September and October 2006 to show a comparative analysis of the attacks the recent surge of insurgent activity in the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria coupled with rising violence in Ingushetia and Dagestan likely points to the geographic shift of the center of violence externally from Chechnya to a new focal point in Ingushetia.


 * Chechnya
 * Despite the geographic shift westward of the North Caucasus insurgency, Chechnya had an increase [[image:Chechdag.JPG width="312" height="278" align="right" caption="June - September 2007: Chechnya And Dagestan" link="http://www.communitywalk.com/map/index/176760#12180010643.=hp746.3KhJ10"]]in attacks and remains significantly active. During the thirteen month time period, September 2006 through September 2007, Chechnya had 103 individual attacks, resulting in 262 casualties, which is approximately 1.2 casualties per attack. The primary targets were Russian security forces suffering 81 percent, or 214, of the total casualties, however, Chechnya accounted for 53 percent of the 401 total security force casualties across the whole North Caucasian region. While the most prolific type of attack used by the insurgents in Chechnya were shootings, representing 50 percent of the total attacks, and second was bombings with 31 percent. Although Chechnya averaged only 7.9 attacks per month, during September 2006 and September 2007 the highest number of attacks occurred, with 15 and 13 individual attacks respectively. In addition, the city of Grozny registered the highest frequency with 24 total attacks, while the Vedeno District had 13 and the Shalinsky District totaled 12.


 * Dagestan
 * Despite the geographic shift westward of the North Caucasus insurgency, Dagestan had an increase in attacks and remains relatively active. During the thirteen month time period, September 2006 through September 2007, Dagestan had 50 individual attacks, resulting in 117 casualties, which is approximately 2.3 casualties per attack. The primary targets were Russian security forces suffering 65 percent, or 77, of the total casualties, however, Dagestan accounted for the second highest casualties among civilians with 33 behind Ingushetia. While the most prolific type of attack used by the insurgents in Dagestan were shootings, representing 78 percent of the total attacks, and second was bombings with 20 percent. Although Dagestan averaged 3.8 attacks per month, during September 2007 and December 2006 the highest number of attacks[[image:Ingushjunsept07.JPG width="177" height="312" align="right" caption="June - Sept 2007: Ingushetia" link="http://www.communitywalk.com/map/index/176760#12170010744.3HST744.1Mkm10#12170457bm10743.23nY743.13;:10"]] occurred, with 7 and 6 individual attacks respectively. In addition, the city of Makhachkala registered the highest frequency with 14 total attacks, while the Khasavyurt district had 13.


 * Ingushetia
 * As a result of the geographic shift westward of the North Caucasus insurgency Ingushetia saw significant increases in both the number of attacks and amount of casualties within the time period of September 2006 and September 2007. During the thirteen months, Ingushetia had 86 total attacks, which was 33 percent of the total attacks in the North Caucasian region. Additionally, Ingushetia suffered 129 casualties, which equates to 1.5 casualties per individual attack. The primary targets were Russian security forces suffering 64 percent, or 83, of the total casualties, however, Ingushetia accounted for 36 percent of the total civilian casualties in the North Caucasus. While the most prolific type of attack used by the insurgents in Ingushetia were shootings, representing 53 percent of the total attacks, and second was bombings with 18 percent. However, between June 2007 and September 2007, grenade launchings increased by 62 percent, which shows sophistication in insurgent tactics. Although Ingushetia averaged 6.6 attacks per month, September 2007 had the highest number of attacks with 24. In addition, the city of Nazran registered the highest frequency of attacks across the entire North Caucasus with 35 total attacks, while the Sunzhensky district had 23.


 * Kabardino-Balkaria
 * As a result of the geographic shift westward of the North Caucasus insurgency Kabardino-Balkaria saw increases in both [[image:KBRjunesept07.JPG align="right" caption="June - September 2007: Kabardino-Balakria" link="http://www.communitywalk.com/map/index/176760#12180010643.=hp746.3KhJ10"]]the number of attacks and amount of casualties within the time period of September 2006 and September 2007. During the thirteen months, Kabardino-Balkaria had 13 individual attacks, resulting in 11 casualties, which is approximately .84 casualties per attack. Despite the low casualty rate, 76 percent of the total attacks and 63 percent of the total casualties occurred between July and September 2007. The primary targets were both the Russian security forces and civilians accounting for 90 percent of the total casualties, or simply 5 casualties each. While the most prolific type of attacks used by the insurgents in Kabardino-Balkaria were bombings, representing 61 percent, or 8, of the total attacks, and second were shootings with 4 individual attacks. Although Kabardino-Balkaria averaged 1 attack per month, September 2007 had the highest number of attacks with 6. In addition, the city of Nalchik registered the highest frequency with 6 total attacks, while the Elbruss District had 4.

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**Insurgency**
The underlying ideological goal of the insurgents within the North Caucasian region is to gain autonomy from Russian rule through the practice of the Islamic faith which plays a critical role in the organization and command structure of the insurgency. However, despite the decentralization of power within the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria resistance network to regional leaders in the North Caucasus, it is likely that insurgent activity in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria will continue to increase over the next six months due to the ineffectiveness of government and Russian security forces to combat the situation. While insurgent activities are increasing in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, it is likely that insurgents in Chechnya and Dagestan will continue their operations through the 2008 president elections due to a steady rate of violent attacks over the last thirteen months and the inability of government and Russian security forces to effectively implement the necessary strategies to combat the active insurgencies in their republics.


 * Chechnya
 * It is virtually certain that the insurgents in Chechnya follow an evolving ideology of the Chechen Sufi Islamic tradition of "Blood[[image:umarovalqaeda.JPG width="331" height="229" align="right" caption="Dokka Umarov" link="http://iczkeria.blog.onet.pl/"]] Revenge"[|,] and the radical Islamist Jihadist Wahhabi and Salafist beliefs in order to gain autonomy from Russia and the creation of a Sharia-based Caliphate in the North Caucasian region. In pursuing these goals, the insurgents rely on a strategy called the "tactic of the bee," which uses the constant rotation of localized fighting groups assigned to a specific region to continually attack Russian forces with fresh, well-equipped fighters. In addition, it is highly likely that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), established in 1991 and under the current leadership of president Dokka Umarov, is responsible for the insurgent activity within Chechnya. In order to remain active, it is likely that the insurgency will continue to rely on the integration of foreign fighters, primarily from the Chechen Diaspora community, to primarily provide supportive functions, like sending small groups of mercenaries through developed networks, recruiting new fighters, collecting financial assistance, and training[|.]


 * Dagestan
 * It is likely that the insurgency is driven by radical Islamic ideals and that militant Islam will continue to fuel the insurgents' activity in Dagestan. Nationalist and Separatist movements are also likely behind the insurgency, however Islam is likely the key growing motivation for insurgent activity. It is also likely that as more Dagestani citizens will turn toward more radical forms of Islam as more of the population becomes discontent with the government and its lack of socio-economic and political reforms. It is likely that as the insurgency is moving westward, insurgent activity in Dagestan will continue over the next twelve months.


 * Ingushetia
 * The number of attacks occurring in Ingushetia in September of 2007 nearly doubled the number of attacks in Chechnya, which illustrates a shift of the center of violence. While the Ingush government attributes this current high level of violence solely to a small group of Arab-financed Islamic radicals, it is virtually certain that a single group is not responsible for all the attacks in the republic[|.] Those likely accountable for the curren upsurge in violence include a combination of Islamic militants, separatists/nationalists, and North Ossetian citizens[|.] Given the sustained crisis, and an almost universal dissatisfaction with the current political and economic state of Ingushetia, all residents have multiple reasons to join the resistance[|.]


 * Kabardino-Balkaria
 * Due to the ineffectiveness of the Russian military and security forces to significantly damage the insurgents structure it is[[image:KBRmountains.jpg width="329" height="386" align="right" caption="Mountains Of KBR" link="http://zhehar.tripod.com/images/kav2.jpg"]] likely that the rebels in Kabardino-Balkaria will continue to recruit more and expand their operations in the North Caucasus region over the next twelve months. Insurgents in KBR make it a top priority to obtain control over the mountanious regions in the North Caucasus in order to set up remote facilities where they can prepare young fighters to join the fight in the future[|.] The strategy of taking control of the foothills and mountainous regions of the northern section of the North Caucasian range allows the insurgents to have access to resources including extra manpower, supplies, and provides safe passage for the insurgents from republic to republic[|.] The Russian forces have been unable to access the mountainous regions that the rebels have been training and recruiting to due to inadequate training[|.] The militants have a network of mountain camps and guerilla bases in the republics in the North Caucasus including Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria[|.] The mountains give the rebels the element of surprise during many of their attacks, giving the Russian forces little time to react appropriately[|.] According to Yuri Tomchak, the Interior Minister of KBR, as of 5 September 2007, about 500 militants are hiding in mountainous areas of the country[|.] The threat of insurgent attacks deter the police forces and army units from pro-actively searching the mountains[|.] This summer, the insurgents have significantly increased their activities, specifically in KBR.

[Return to North Caucasus Key Findings page]

**Demographic (Socio-Economic)**
Low economic standards throughout the North Caucasus region are likely to increase insurgent activity mainly fueled by Islamic teachings. High unemployment rates in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria are unlikely to be resolved by the local governments in the North Caucasus region and likely to incite further. Muslims turn to the Islamic faith in attempts to combat the corruption and economic standards of the region. Authorities have not responded to the economic and social needs of the citizens of the North Caucasus republics. Chechnya's President, Ramzan Kadyrov, voiced his desire to unity Ingushetia and Chechnya as one single, unified republic. As Ingushetia continues to be plagued with increasing insurgency related violence, Kadyrov likely sees the deteriorating situation in Ingushetia as an opportunity to expand his control over the region. In addition, Kadryov inability to create jobs for the Chechens is likely to create a safe haven for the recruitment of dissatisfied citizens to join the insurgency.


 * Chechnya
 * In pursuing economic reformations, it is highly likely that Ramzan Kadyrov is pushing the acquisition of special economic status for Chechnya from the Kremlin and the sale of its natural resources to international consumers in order to spur economic investment[|.] The implementation of special economic zones allows Chechnya’s government to avoid paying customs tariffs and provide additional tax-breaks to willing investors[|.] However, it is likely that with the existence of the Kadyrov Foundation, a supposed philanthropic organization, Kremlin officials question whether Kadyrov will invest the profits from the natural resources back into restoring Chechnya economic infrastructure[|.] A contributing factor to the need for economic infrastructural improvement is that as of May 2007 approximately 300,000 Chechens remain unemployed out of a population of just over one million; however due to the clan structure of Chechnya’s society, estimates also range as high as 70-80 percent[|.] Thus, it is virtually certain that the lack of a focus on creating jobs by Kadyrov threatens the stability of Chechnya as the socio-economic conditions provide a safe haven environment for the recruiting of these disenfranchised citizens to join the insurgency.


 * Dagestan
 * Low economic standings is likely main cause likely behind the growing number of Muslims in the North Caucasus and more specifically Dagestan. It is likely that more Dagestani citizens are turning to Islamic beliefs in attempts to counteract the corruption of local government officials and the low socio-economic standards of living in Dagestan. A growing number of kidnappings in Dagestan by Russian security forces is likely leading to greater insurgent activity, and in most cases the suspect was taken under false pretenses and not in actuality a terrorist as believed by the security forces.


 * Ingushetia
 * The former leader of the Chechen insurgency, Shamil Basayev, took responsibility for the attack in Beslan, North Ossetia in [[image:_460594_shamil_300.jpg align="right" caption="Shamil Basayev" link="http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/460000/images/_460594_shamil_300.jpg"]]2004, which resulted in over 300 deaths and 700 wounded. Basayev’s ultimate goal after taking responsibility for the attacks was to ignite tensions between the Christian Ossetians, and the Muslim Ingush citizens. Since the Beslan attack, violence has increased near Ossetian-Ingush borders, with reports of kidnappings of ethnic Ingush people by the Ossetian group, Lesnyi Bratia. Lesnyi Bratia reportedly receives financial and logistical support from both the government and security apparatus of North Ossetia. In addition, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov issued numerous statements to the press indicating his desire to unite Ingushetia and Chechnya as one single republic. Kadyrov sees the deteriorating situation in Ingushetia as an opportunity to expand his realm of power by bringing Ingushetia under his control. A current categorical opposition towards a unified state by Ingush citizens points to an even worse violent response in the future.


 * Kabardino-Balkaria
 * There is a high degree of dissatisfaction among the people of Kabardino-Balkaria due to the socio-economic problems in the republic. A survey from late 2005 from the Caucasus Times survey in Nalchik indicated that economic problems concern 95% of the Kabardino-Balkaria population. In addition, 44% of residents are concerned about security in the republic which is the cause of most of the economic instability. Many people have expressed that the most current problems are high prices of products, low wages, unemployment, and corruption and believe that these negative impacts are direct causes of instability due to insurgent activity. Kabardino-Balkaria’s economy will likely continue to suffer as violence continues to spread throughout the region.

[Return to North Caucasus Key Findings page]

**Russian Capabilities And Effectiveness**
The culmination of major combat operations of the second Chechen war eliminated key insurgent leadership and degenerated the violence in the North Caucasus to primarily low level violence such as shootings and ambushes. However, counterterrorism efforts by Russian security forces did not stop the insurgency, and only moved the center of violence west of Chechnya to the republic of Ingushetia. While large scale attacks are currently less prevalent in the North Caucasus, ineffective counterterrorism techniques contributed to the actual number of attacks growing over the past 12 months. Increased troop presence in Ingushetia in September 2007 only increased the targeting of Russian security forces within the republic, and proved ineffective in curtailing the growing violence in the North Caucasus. It is likely that Russian and republic security forces will continue to ineffectively combat the growing insurgency over the next 12 months due to counterinsurgency tactics which fail to stop the insurgency from expanding, and a failure by government and military leadership to create a clear strategy which utilizes known information about insurgent tactics while simultaneously gaining the trust of civilians within the region.


 * Chechnya
 * Despite the decree issued on 2 August 2006 by Vladimir Putin requiring the staged withdrawal of Russian forces under their[[image:01putin550.jpg width="382" height="222" align="right" caption="Vladimir Putin" link="http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/01/europe/russia.php"]] command to start in 2007 and conclude at the end of 2008, it is highly unlikely that the role and number of troops inside Chechnya will diminish over the next twelve months [|.] In support, on 3 October 2007, Yakov Nedobitko, commander of the Joint Military Group in Chechnya, stated that, "the mission procedures and scope of the group will not fundamentally change" this fall or winter and that no real withdrawal of Russian forces has yet to begin as 2007 comes to an end[|.] In September 2007 alone Russian security forces suffered twenty-one casualties in thirteen attacks in Chechnya inflicted by the insurgents, which was a decrease of only two less attacks in Chechnya compared to fifteen in September 2006. In the last thirteen months, September 2006 through September 2007, Chechnya experienced 103 individual insurgent attacks, causing 262 casualties, of which Russian security forces accounted for 214, or 81 percent, of them. Over the last four months, June 2007 through September 2007, 38 percent, or 90, of Chechnya's total attacks took place, consisting of 34 percent, or 90, of the total casualties.


 * Dagestan
 * In an effort to combat the rising level of violence in Dagestan, local security forces are likely to continue using kidnapping as a method of attempting to control insurgent activity. However, this tactic is unlikely to be effective, as a large number of the kidnappings are of "suspected terrorists" who often turn out not be related to insurgent activity. Conversely, kidnappings by Russian security forces is on the rise and likely to continue to grow in number, as kidnapping by insurgents are decreasing, security forces involved in kidnapping are increasing in number.


 * Ingushetia
 * On August 8th 2007, Vladimir Putin sent 2,500 federal Russian soldiers to Ingushetia to combat the daily murders, shootings, bombings, and other violence within the republic [|.] Despite Putin’s efforts, the deployment of more troops to Ingushetia only increased the violence in the area and created more potential targets for violent groups to exploit. The Russian government ordered the removal of the 2,500 additional soldiers on October 10th, who left the republic in the same violent ridden state it was in a month earlier[|.] The people of Ingushetia distrust the current regional security groups, due to the extensive and common belief that operational group members currently engage in the kidnappings and murders of young people in the Ingushetia territory [|.] The current security tactics taking place in Ingushetia of preemptive military action and a hard-line stance against public demonstrations mirrors the past tactics used in neighboring Chechnya which were orchestrated by both Vladimir Putin and Chechen President Razman Kadyrov[|.] While Kadyrov did disperse much of the insurgency and eliminate many violent leaders in Chechnya, his perceived victory only moved the violence elsewhere, and the insurgency presently continues to gather force. The current counterinsurgency strategy does not address socio-economic and political issues which fuel violence in the region[|.]


 * Kabardino-Balkaria
 * It is likely that Russian military and security forces will remain ineffective at battling the insurgency in the next twelve months. In response to increased activity by insurgents in mountainous regions, the Russian military has recently sent specialized mountain warfare units to the North Caucasus, however, the implementation of these units into active operations will not occur until the end of 2007[|.] Even though a training exercise took place between July to 13 August 2007 in the Elbrus District of KBR, the mountain forces lack real counterinsurgency experience[|.] On 8 May 2007, high ranking officials of KBR and staff from North Caucasianyfhjkl police academies met attended a seminar in Nalchik, the capital of KBR, to discuss the problem of poor intelligence collection by Russian forces on the insurgents in KBR[|.] Fueling the lack of good intelligence is the distrust of law enforcement by the local population[|.] Interior Minister Tomchak stated that, "only popular trust in the law enforcement bodies would help establish an effective system of getting information from the grass roots.[|"]

[Return to North Caucasus Key Findings page]

The insurgency that originally began in Chechnya is now damaging the overall political systems of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya, Arsen Kanokov in Kabardino-Balkaria, Mukhu Aliyev in Dagestan, and Murat Zyazikov in Ingushetia. Despite an end to Putin’s reign as president, is highly likely that Kadyrov will retain the Kremlin’s support over the next six months due to Putin remaining in a position of power by becoming the leading candidate for the dominant political party, United Russia. As a result of the increasing affect of the insurgency on the political systems through its spread westward towards Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, it is highly likely that the political systems in these republics will continue to fail and lose support in the next twelve months due to the Russian security forces inability to battle the insurgency.
 * Kremlin Ability To Control**


 * Chechnya
 * It is highly likely that Ramzan Kadyrov began solidifying his relations with the Kremlin upon holding the political positions of[[image:Putin_KadyrovR.jpg width="275" height="261" align="right" caption="Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov" link="http://www.ruvr.ru/files/Image/RUSSIA/chechnya/Putin_KadyrovR.jpg"]] deputy prime minister, first deputy prime minister in October 2004, and then on to the Premier of Chechnya in February 2006[|.] Also it is virtually certain that Vladimir Putin fully backed Kadyrov's ascension to power when, on 5 May 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov accepted the presidency for the Russian Republic of Chechnya due to Putin's efforts “to eliminate all obstructions in the path of the young pawn of one of the Kremlin’s cliques.[|”] Prior to receiving the presidential nomination, however, Kadyrov aligned his political goals with those of the Kremlin by dismissing a long standing power-sharing treaty between Grozny and Moscow, which would “undermine the concept of Russian statehood.[|"] As a result, in regards to the upcoming 2008 Russian presidential election in March, it is highly likely that Kadyrov’s political strategy is against allying with any of the potential candidates, instead choosing to maintain a status-quo approach as an ally of the Kremlin[|.] In further support, on 1 October 2007, Putin announced that he intends to represent Russia’s dominant political party, United Russia, as its leading candidate, thereby vowing to hold on to power within the Russian Government from a position other than through the presidency[|.]


 * Dagestan
 * Political, social, and economic deterioration in Dagestan is likely to continue due to the large numb[[image:mukhu_aliev.jpg width="223" height="194" align="right" caption="Dagestani President Mukhu Aliyev" link="Dagestan - Political"]]ers of ethnic groups and the deep division among those groups. It is unlikely that Dagestani President Mukhu Aliyev will enact reforms or changes in which the political or socio-economic status of Dagestan will improve. Aliyev, considered a "massive disappointment" by the people of Dagestan, is likely to continue to prove inadequate to the growing needs of the republic.Dagestan's political climate is likely to continue its inter-ethnic party conflicts, where most of the debate is not among political parties, but instead among ethnic groups and clans, especially since the Aliyev has not attempted to bring the clans together in order to create change.


 * Ingushetia
 * The Kremlin’s direct involvement in the installation of loyal local-elites, such as Murat Zyazikov, mirrors past Russian Imperial and Soviet strategies of maintaining control over the North Caucasus[|.] These previous strategies have historically been ineffective, and subsequently intensified tensions, produced new conflicts, and resulted in power shifts within the system rather than changing the system itself[|.] Under Zyazikov, Ingushetia’s economy has marginally improved, but the[[image:murat.jpg align="right" caption="Murat Zyazikov" link="http://www.itar-tass.com/img/news_img_11888037_0006.jpg"]] republic currently holds the lowest income per-capita in the Russian Federation and a 36% unemployment rate[|.] The administration also currently shows neither the wherewithal to curtail the rising violence nor the ability to deal with unresolved ethnic problems[|.] This Ingush government's ineffectiveness is one of the driving forces behind the current upsurge of violence in the republic. While Putin openly praises the work of Zyazikov in the media, sources within the Kremlin believe Putin’s patience is wearing thin, and Putin may move to remove Zyazikov, coerce him to resign, or even unite Ingushetia and Chechnya as one republic[|.] In the eyes of the people of Ingushetia, President Zyazikov did not enter into office through a democratic process, and therefore lacks local legitimacy[|.] Numerous recent protests and increasingly severe acts of violence in Ingushetia highlight a socio-political tension that is unrivaled in the North Caucasus[|.] Amidst this widespread unpopularity, Zyazikov’s administration insists that those who oppose them are part of an undifferentiated Islamist radicalism, which by doing so turns even those Muslims loyal to the Russian state against the Ingush government [|.]


 * Kabardino-Balkaria
 * It is likely that Arsen Kanokov will continue to lose support over the next twelve months due to the instability of the economy[[image:arsen.jpg width="241" height="271" align="right" caption="Asen Kanokov" link="http://www.ajanskafkas.com/cache/e8212c297fce2853a32950b50fe6fd5d.jpg"]] and diminishing security in the republic. Support for Arsen Kanokov diminished because the populace is unsatisfied with his strategies against battling the insurgency[|.] Due to the fact that social and economic conditions are poor, insurgent activities will continue to affect the stability of the region[|.] Kanokov has recently stated that his recent campaign against religious extremism was counterproductive[|.] The closing of almost all mosques by republic officials during the campaign was a "mistake” that did more harm than good[|.] Rather than focusing on improving the local economy and stopping corruption, local governments ­have become obsessed with the idea of religious extremism[|.] This causes more problems because it has been used to increase recruiting done by the militants in the mountanious regions of the North Caucasus[|.] Unless polices are implemented by the current government that increase socioeconomic stability the militants will continue to attack and President Kanokov will lose more support from the populace[|.] Svante Cornell, an expert on the North Caucasus region at Sweden's Uppsala University said,"...you've seen the spread of radical Islamic groupings from Chechnya out into the rest of the North Caucasus very much because of the counterproductive policies followed by the Russian leadership and their utter inability to deal with the socioeconomic problems in the region[|.]"

[Return to North Caucasus Key Findings page]

**Survivability Of The Kadyrov Regime**
Despite the upcoming 2008 Russian presidential election in March that will end Vladimir Putin’s reign as president, it is highly likely that Ramzan Kadyrov retains the Kremlin’s support due to Putin remaining in a position of power by becoming the leading candidate for the dominant political party, United Russia. Kadyrov accepted the presidency for the Russian Republic of Chechnya on 5 May 2007, with full support from the Kremlin and Putin. Prior to receiving the presidential nomination, however, Kadyrov aligned his political goals with those of the Kremlin by dismissing a power-sharing treaty between Grozny and Moscow that undermined the concept of Russian statehood.


 * Following Ramzan Kadyrov’s ideological change, and after receiving the //Hero of Russia// award from Putin in December 2004 for his leadership in Chechnya[|,] Kadyrov began solidifying his relationship with the Kremlin. The relationship began with the promotion of Kadyrov from deputy prime minister to first deputy prime minister in October 2004, and then on to the Premier of Chechnya in February 2006[|.] Then, on 5 May 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov accepted the presidency for the Russian Republic of Chechnya by reciting the oath of office replacing Alu Alkhanov, who resigned on 15 February 2007[|.] Putin fully backed Kadyrov’s ascension to power, as Putin made sure “to eliminate all obstructions in the path of the young pawn of one of the Kremlin’s cliques.[|”] Prior to receiving the presidential nomination, however, Kadyrov aligned his political goals with those of the Kremlin by dismissing a long standing power-sharing treaty between Grozny and Moscow, which would “undermine the concept of Russian statehood.[|"] As a result, in regards to the upcoming 2008 Russian presidential election in March, Kadyrov’s political strategy is against allying with any of the potential candidates, instead choosing to maintain a status-quo approach as an ally of the Kremlin[|.] In further support, on 1 October 2007, Putin announced that he intends to represent Russia’s dominant political party, United Russia, as its leading candidate, thereby vowing to hold on to power within the Russian Government from a position other than through the presidency[|.]

**Additional Comments:**
None.

Source Reliability: 7 Analytic Confidence: 7

Authors: Christopher Anderson I Kathryn Connelly I Matthew Gurto I Robert Williams


 * Republics:** Chechnya I Dagestan I Ingushetia I Kabardino-Balkaria

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