Ingushetia+-+Russian+Effectiveness

=New Counter-Insurgency Efforts Unlikely To Be Effective In Worsening Situation In Ingushetia=

Executive Summary:
In response to an increasingly deteriorating situation in Ingushetia, Vladimir Putin is instituting new efforts to bring security to the embattled republic. The current counter-insurgency strategy in Ingushetia is likely to remain ineffective over the next 12 months due to the use of tactics which recruit more militants, a weak support for security forces within the republic, and a failure to remedy socio-economic problems by the government. Any future attempt to mirror the counterterrorism techniques of Chechnya by using overpowering military force will likely only move the center of violence to other regions, and further prolong the conflict.

Discussion:
On August 8th 2007, Vladimir Putin sent 2,500 federal Russian soldiers to Ingushetia to combat the daily murders, shootings, bombings, and other violence within the republic [|.] Despite Putin’s efforts, the deployment of more troops to Ingushetia only increased the violence in the area and created more potential targets for violent groups to exploit. The Russian government ordered the removal of the 2,500 additional soldiers on October 10th, who left the republic in the same violent ridden state it was in a month earlier[|.] Putin currently calls Ingushetia a counter-terrorism zone, the same moniker placed upon Chechnya before the Second Chechen War[|.] The harsh and extreme tactics of Russian security forces, including reprisals and kidnappings, alienates Ingush citizens against the government and recruits more militants towards the resistance[|.]

In September 2007, Putin organized temporary operational groups of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in each Ingush district's police department[|.] These operational groups consist of 25-30 policemen from different regions of the Russian Federation, along with employees of the Federal Security Service from neighboring republics[|.] The people of Ingushetia distrust these security groups, due to the extensive and common belief that operational group members currently engage in the kidnappings and murders of young people in the Ingushetia territory[|.] Ingush and federal security forces are also involved in reprisals against young Muslim men and Muslim Imams, which they claim is a proactive measure to neutralize potential rebels and sympathizers of the insurgency[|.]

The current security tactics taking place in Ingushetia of preemptive military action and a hard-line stance against public demonstrations mirrors the past tactics used in neighboring Chechnya which were orchestrated by both Vladimir Putin and Chechen President Razman Kadyrov[|.] While Kadyrov was effective in moving insurgents out of Chechnya, Ingush President Murat Zyazikov has neither the power nor the forces which Kadryov had when he instituted his harsh counterinsurgency plan in 2005[|.] While Kadyrov did disperse much of the insurgency and eliminate many violent leaders in Chechnya, his perceived victory only moved the violence elsewhere, and the insurgency presently continues to gather force. Putin currently subscribes to a one-dimensional security approach which entails pervasive capturing and killing of militants in order to quell the insurgency[|.] This strategy does not address socio-economic and political issues which fuel violence in the region[|.]

There are fears that Putin and Chechen President Ramzan Kadryov are in favor of an unstable and violent Ingushetia[|.] Ingushetia’s current state of prevalent violence benefits Kadyrov because it gives him a concrete example of why Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan should become one nation under his rule[|.] Putin also profits from an unstable Ingushetia, because it is an unresolved conflict which requires him to remain in power as prime minister[|.]

media type="youtube" key="sF-w_k6GEPk" width="425" height="350" Russian Security Forces Attempting To Disperse A Demonstration In Nazran //September 19th 2007//

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 7 Analytic Confidence: 7

Robert A. Williams

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