Dagestan+-+Russian+Effectiveness

=Russian Security Forces Likely To Use Kidnapping Tactics To Attempt To Minimize Insurgent Activity; Unlikely To Prove Effective=

Executive Summary:
The Russian Security Forces are likely to use kidnapping to deal with insurgent activities in Dagestan. Although the Security Forces believe that this method is technically an "arrest", it in fact is more similar to kidnapping. Often the security forces transfer the suspects to a military base in Chechnya and then interrogate by torture. Since it is outside of the Dagestani courts' jurisdiction, no missing person notification is necessary and families of the suspects are unaware of their locations. Neither these kidnappings nor brute military force are likely to have an impact on insurgent activity.

Discussion:
Russia relies on oppressive methods in attempts to decrease militant activity in the Caucasus region and authorities are hesitant to use these methods are restricted from voicing their opinions. In an article entitled, //Radicalising Russia's Caucasian Muslims//, Jane's Information Group states that local authorities looking to create a "positive strategy" are often considered "powerless" and ineffective. In an effort to combat the rising level of violence in Dagestan, local security forces now use controversial methods, including "zakhvat" or "the snatch" of suspected militants. This method is technically referred to as an "arrest", although in actuality, it is kidnapping. These kidnappings are also referred to as “extra-judicial executions” or “illegal detentions”. Although the insurgents are traditionally known to participate in a majority of the kidnappings in the Caucasus region, since 2006 the number of kidnappings decreased seven percent throughout the North Caucasus region. Conversely, kidnappings by Russian security forces is on the rise. It is assumed that these kidnappings are performed in "hostile" territories and considered "arrests".

Persons taken by security forces in Dagestan are often sent to an army base in Chechnya for interrogation and in some cases tortured, beaten, and subjected to military law. Jane's Information Group states that the primary reason that militants are captured and sent to locations outside of the republic's jurisdiction, is so that there is a smaller risk of local fighters and sympathizers freeing the captives. Also, the relocation allows a large number of suspects to "disappear" so that their families have difficulty locating them or finding out if they are even alive. No notification of the missing person is required since it is outside of the jurisdiction of the Dagestani courts. In addition to the rising number of kidnappings, there is a growing trend toward the use of ransom, as there is an extremely high level of corruption and lack of oversight with these types of operations. The central ministry of the interior of Moscow reports that one in five of all kidnappings in the North Caucasus is likely carried out by security forces and ransomed for up to USD50,000.

Violence in the Dagestani republic is likely to continue to increase, specifically with low level attacks including shootings and bombings. Between September 2006 and September 2007, there were 50 attacks. September 2007 recorded the highest number of attacks, with seven total within Dagestan and a total of 50 between Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In addition, rebel activity, according to reports from the Jamestown Foundation, has increased since the beginning of 2007[|.]

Additional Comments:
None.

Source Reliability: 7 Analytic Confidence: 4.5

Kathryn A Connelly

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