Main+Insurgency+Chechnya

=**Chechen Insurgents Likely To Expand Operations In Chechnya And North Caucasus Region Over The Next Twelve Months**=

The Chechen resistance movement follows an evolving ideology of the Chechen Sufi Islamic tradition of "Blood Revenge," combined with radical Wahhabi and Salafist beliefs in an effort to gain autonomy from Russia and establish a Sharia-based Caliphate in the North Caucasus region. Despite the deaths of prominent Chechen insurgent leaders and foreign Islamic jihadists, it is likely that the Chechen insurgents will expand their operations in Chechnya and the North Caucasus region over the next twelve months due to the decentralization of power within the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria network to regional leaders, the implementation of autonomous military jamaats, and the continued access to the foreign fighters' international resources.
 * Executive Summary:**

The insurgents in Chechnya follow an evolving ideology of the Chechen Sufi Islamic tradition of "Blood Revenge"[|,] and the radical Islamist Jihadist Wahhabi and Salafist beliefs in order to gain autonomy from Russia and the creation of a Sharia-based Caliphate in the North Caucasian region. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), established in 1991, leads this evolving resistance movement in fighting for their cause against the Russians, while at the same time maintaining an active and coherent military capacity to attack the pro-Kremlin security forces loyal to President Putin[|.]
 * Discussion:**

Through the establishment of the //Madzhlisul Shura// leadership council, or Consultative Assembly, as the top governing body of the resistance movement, a "free-scale network" of associated insurgent groups throughout the North Caucasus came under the leadership of the ChRI in August 2002, which established the president, or emir, of the Shura council as the supreme authority of the movement. In 2005 following the death of ChRI president Aslan Maskhadov, the resistance movement fully adopted Islam as its fundamental ideology in an effort to attach its national separatist ideology to the international jihadist movement.

Following the deaths of prominent ChRI leaders, Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Halim Sadulaev and warlord Shamil Basayev in July 2006, Dokku Umarov assumed full command of the resistance and immediately reorganized not only the anti-Russian insurgents in Chechnya, but all across the North Caucasus region[|.] In September 2006 Umarov announced the promotions of three regional commanders to the rank of brigadier generals, including Suleiman Imurzayev (Hayrullah), Rabbani Khalilov, from Dagestan, and Akmed Yevloyev (Magas), from Ingushetia[|.] These appointments represent the inter-generational changes Umarov instituted, which focuses on placing the chain of command of the resistance movement in the hands of younger experienced separatist fighters from the second Chechen war with Russia[|.]

In addition, the resistance movement also relies on the integration of the Chechen Diaspora community, specifically from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan and Kazakhstan, and on Islamic fighters, with foreign connections, to set up military jamaats[|.] Since 2005, Umarov incorporated the Nogai battalions, the Islamic Front of Ingushetia, the Yarmuk jamaat from Kabardino-Balkaria, and the Dagestani jamaats under his command[|.] The role of foreign fighters, though, is primarily to provide supportive functions by sending small groups of mercenaries, recruiting new fighters, collecting financial assistance, and training[|.] Despite the deaths of key foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda operatives Ibn ul-Khattab, Abu Walid al-Ghamidi and Abu Hafs al-Urdani[|,] networks still exist between Chechnya and the Chechen Diaspora community, along with a continued connection with international organizations, like Al-Qaeda, developed through the previously mentioned deceased insurgents[|.]

Due to the strategy of targeting key figures in the separatist movement by Russian security forces since 2005, the resistance fighters formed mobile Mujahideen units in order to rely less on a central leader and function more independently[|.] According to Gordon Hahn, author of //Russia's Islamic Threat//, the insurgents rely on a strategic called, the "tactic of the bee," which implements the constant rotation of localized fighting groups assigned to a specific region to continually attack Russian forces with fresh, well-equipped fighters (see video below). These units consist of between ten to twelve members, however some are fewer than 5, and use tactics such as ambushes, mine-laying, sabotage, and planned assassinations[|.] In addition, large-scale operations employ anti-aircraft maneuvers, suicide bombings, and hostage taking. Although the information regarding the actual number of resistance fighters in Chechnya is contradicting, estimates range from 300 to as many as 800[|.]

Nonetheless, since March 2007, the Chechen resistance received 350 new recruits and according to Chechen Interior Minister Ruslan Alkhanov, disgruntled law enforcement officers and about 200 Kadyrovtsy members defected to the insurgency[|.] These new recruits followed a pattern of fleeing to the mountainous regions where, according to Umarov, the resistance is establishing new bases and training facilities[|.] From these mountain bases the fighters are trying to take control of specific areas of Chechnya through the use of checkpoints to monitor the movement of Russian security forces. An example of this strategy exists in the Nozhai-Yurt and Kurchaloi districts[|,] and a permanent checkpoint in the village of Regita, which is strategically located at the entrance to the Nozhai-Yurt district (Regita acts as a thoroughfare between the Mountains and the Valley)[|.]

media type="youtube" key="NP2KYKmV-XU&rel=1&border=0" height="355" width="425"

None.
 * Additional Comments:**

Source Reliability: 8 Analytical Confidence: 8

Christopher Anderson

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